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 A gendered ethnography of elites 
Women, inequality, and social reproduction 
Luna Glucksberg 
 
Abstract: This article offers a critical ethnography of the reproduction of elites and inequalities 
through the lenses of class and gender. The successful transfer of wealth from one generation to 
the next is increasingly a central concern for the very wealthy. This article shows how the labor 
of women from elite and non-elite backgrounds enables and facilitates the accumulation of 
wealth by elite men. From covering “the home front” to investing heavily in their children’s 
future, and engaging non-elite women’s labor to help them, the elite women featured here 
reproduced not just their families, but their families as elites. Meanwhile, the affective and 
emotional labor of non-elite women is essential for maintaining the position of wealth elites 
while also locking those same women into the increasing inequality they help to reproduce. 
Keywords: Alpha Territories, class, elites, ethnography, gender, wealth transfer 
 
Introduction: A gendered, critical ethnography of elites 
This article answers the call of this theme section—for an anthropology of elites that is both 
ethnographic and attuned to political economic critique—by looking ethnographically at the 
reproduction of elites and inequalities through the lenses of both class and gender. Class and 
gender are intertwined, produced, and reproduced through one another, implicating the personal, 
intimate, and familial relations in which they exist, as well as the broader economic and 
sociopolitical realities that they help reproduce. I focus on the importance of women’s labor in 
the reproduction of elite families in relation to the continuing growth of inequality in 
 contemporary society. I do this by comparing the stories and experiences of two different sets of 
women: elite women who work to reproduce their families in the domestic sphere and non-elite 
women whose paid work helps to reproduce the elites. The decision to look ethnographically at 
elites is born out of an increased concern with the rise of economic inequality worldwide, which 
is described perhaps most notably by the historical economist Thomas Piketty (2014), as well as 
out of a revival in the study of elites in the social sciences in general (Khan 2012a; Savage 2015; 
Urry 2014). Following Anthony Atkinson (2015), I argue that we should be thinking about elites 
in terms of the longue dureé: a slow and constant process of accumulation. This process involves 
not just economic assets but also social, educational, and symbolic capitals. It is not, however, 
just about accumulating capitals; it is about capitals and people entwined together to forge long-
lasting dynasties. 
My approach also follows a sociological shift, which is exemplified by the work of Mike 
Savage and colleagues (2013) on the Great British Class Survey, toward creating more nuanced, 
detailed understandings of the groups at the top end of the income and wealth distribution curves. 
This involves a shift away from the obsession, especially in the British context, of drawing 
boundaries between the working and middle classes. From a more anthropological perspective, it 
also involves exploring the tensions between studying with and among elites while 
acknowledging elites in classed terms as the apex of material and symbolic accumulation 
processes. 
The gendered aspect of elite reproduction was first evident during my fieldwork, where it 
emerged organically from more than two years of interviews and from extended periods of 
participant observation. The areas I studied constitute the most expensive parts of London, 
sometimes referred to by estate agents as “prime,” “super-prime,” or even “ultra-prime” London. 
 This research was conducted as part of a two-year project funded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) looking at the effect of global wealth on the most elite areas of 
London.
1
 In total, more than one hundred individuals were interviewed for this project: these 
included elite residents and a broad spectrum of service providers from designers to estate 
agents, asset managers to art dealers, and beauticians to carers and florists. The main reason for 
seeking out individuals who were not part of any elite themselves was to understand the impact 
of elites on the people who lived and worked for and around them, considering the “mutual 
constitution of elites and subalterns” (Gilbert and Sklair, this issue), and to challenge the fantasy 
that elites’ privilege is somehow disconnected from the “dire straits of the lower orders” 
(Toscano and Woodcock 2015: 513). 
Methodologically, the project—set up before I joined the team—was based on a 
geodemographic framework (Burrows 2013). The areas studied sit in a crescent that goes from 
Chelsea in the south, up through South Kensington, Knightsbridge, Belgravia, Mayfair, Notting 
Hill, and Holland Park, all the way to Hampstead and Highgate in the north. Areas outside of the 
center of London but still considered by the project were located around Esher, Cobham, and 
Virginia Water, which are well known for having the most expensive house prices in the United 
Kingdom outside of London (Osbourne 2015). Properties in these areas usually sell for more 
than two million pounds. One of the most important consequences of this spatial, area-based 
approach was that it dispensed with the need to define “elites” as people, whether by income, 
influence, or position in society, and focused instead on “elite” areas: the “Alpha Territories.”2 
My research on elite and non-elite women in these geographies demonstrated the various 
ways in which the reproduction of elites depends on intimately gendered processes. In exploring 
these processes from a theoretical perspective, my work responds to the position outlined in the 
 Gens feminist manifesto for the study of capitalism (Bear et al. 2015): “Class does not exist 
outside of its generation in gender, race, sexuality, and kinship.” In this article, I focus both on 
the domestic and reproductive labor of elite women and the intimately related caring, affective 
labor of non-elite women present in their lives and homes. I explore the ways in which elites are 
socialized, and how these practices are embodied, by looking at the labor of diverse female 
bodies and their roles in creating highly successful elite families. I argue that gender, women, 
and women’s labor are keys to the reproduction of elites in ways that are specific and different 
from men’s contributions to these processes. So far, apart from a few exceptions (Bear et al. 
2015; Bourdieu 1996; Ostrander 1984; Yanagisako 2000), gender has not been a particular focus 
of elite studies. The ethnography I present here addresses this gap, showing just how crucial 
gender is for the reproduction of elites. 
The labor that elite women perform often goes unrecognized not just by social scientists 
but even by the women themselves. This aligns the women in this class with the very well- 
established paradigm of examining the invisibility of gendered, reproductive, and affective labor. 
While this paradigm initially emerged to describe the invisible reproductive work of working-
class women who subsidized the production of working-class bodies, theorists such as Maria 
Luisa Setien and Elaine Acosta (2013) and Christine Verschuur (2013) have also demonstrated 
how flows of labor within the global economy see the gendered, reproductive work of female 
migrants from the Global South replacing the unpaid domestic labor of women in developed 
nations. 
While drawing on this literature, this article proposes a shift in focus by asking how the 
paradigm of the invisible, gendered work of reproduction might be explored in relation to the 
labor of elite women. By adopting a critical ethnographic approach, I pursue this inquiry from 
 two parallel perspectives. First, I explore—ethnographically—the experiences of two sets of 
women (elite and non-elite) as they engage in reproductive and affective labor in elite settings. 
Second, I draw on a critical perspective in order to examine the centrality of this gendered labor 
to the maintenance and reproduction of elite wealth and status, processes that serve, in turn, the 
reproduction of social and economic inequalities on a broader scale. 
 
Intergenerational wealth transfers and elite reproduction 
Wealth advisers estimate that the biggest wealth transfer event in recorded history will take place 
between 2007 and 2061. It will consist of $59 trillion being transferred and divided among heirs, 
charities, and foundations—and that is in the United States alone (Rosplock and Hauser 2014). 
Piketty (2014) and others have convincingly argued that Western nations may have enjoyed a 
brief period of falling inequality from the 1920s to the 1970s, which was, rather than a 
progressive trend, almost a blip in a much longer historical trajectory of growing inequality. This 
period of declining inequality, which was characterized by a push toward the redistribution of 
material resources in society, ended with the introduction of Margaret Thatcher’s and Ronald 
Reagan’s neoliberal policies, which enshrined once again the preeminence of the weight of 
capital accumulated by previous generations. From an anthropological perspective, kinship 
mattered again. From the 1980s onward, the best way to be part of the elite, or even the middle 
class, was once again to have been born into it. Thus, Shamus Khan (2012b: 367) asks “whether 
elite seizure is an anomaly that will be rectified or a return to the kind of normal dominance 
experienced for much of history.” 
In this context, transfers between generations are a key driver of social and economic 
inequalities. They ensure that wealth is not redistributed but is instead accumulated in the hands 
 of a small elite, which is sometimes described as “the super-rich” (Freeland 2012; Urry 2014). I 
argue in this article that it is crucial to understand how this accumulated capital is socialized and 
passed down through the generations through a labor that is gendered in nature, heavily reliant 
on women, and currently underresearched. Indeed, Savage (2014: 603) argues that one of the 
most important tasks for contemporary social scientists consists of asking, “What kinds of rituals 
and symbolic life is characteristic of the super wealthy and the broader elite?” 
This concern with the sociocultural aspects of elite life and reproduction does not, 
however, signal a retreat from the structural, economic aspects of elite reproduction. I have 
described elsewhere how elites ensure their continuous financial dominance through long-term 
economic investment and capital accumulation, which is often entrusted to teams employed by 
wealthy families precisely to look after their affairs, their “private” or family offices (Glucksberg 
and Burrows 2016). It would be ill advised to fall into the trap, which Khan (2012b: 368) warns 
us against, of mobilizing “cultural” explanations for the advantaged (such as meritocratic 
discourses) while looking for structural explanations for poverty. Indeed, critical ethnography 
attempts to avoid this trap, considering both the cultural and symbolic practices of these groups, 
as well as the economic and structural processes that allow them to remain at the top of the 
socioeconomic hierarchies they are part of. 
 
Gendering the elites 
There were 2,473 billionaires in the world in 2015 controlling a total wealth equal to $7,683 
billion; 88.1 percent of them were males, and men controlled 88.6 percent of the total wealth 
(Wealth-X 2015–2016). Aside from the obvious imbalance that means that there are 8.4 male 
billionaires for each female billionaire, the marriage patterns of these individuals are certainly of 
 note; 85 percent of all billionaires were married in 2015, and the rate was as high as 88 percent 
for men. In the United Kingdom, the Office for National Statistics estimated that 50.6 percent of 
adults were married, while in the United States the Census Bureau put the figure at 60.1 percent. 
Taken together, these data seem to suggest that the great majority of billionaires are not only 
men (8.4 male to one female) but that they are, disproportionately, married men. 
Marriage is clearly important to these men. Indeed, they appear to be substantially better 
than average at being or remaining married. The available data were not detailed enough to 
understand how many times the individuals in question had been married, but my own 
qualitative research on succession and family offices (Glucksberg and Burrows 2016) has 
indicated that divorces are frowned upon and avoided at all costs within elite families because of 
the threat of splitting the families’ capital. This research suggests that marriage is seen as a 
fundamental vehicle for the production of future generations of elites and that stable, long-lasting 
marriages are thus seen as integral to a “successful” dynasty-making project. 
The ethnographic data presented in this article will show how much labor these women 
invested in these marriages, how they eschewed the development of their own careers for the 
sake of their families and the maintenance of their own privilege, and, in general, how they 
accepted patriarchal gender roles that placed their labor firmly within the domestic sphere. This 
is not, however, a new feature of elite women’s lives. In 1984, Susan Ostrander wrote what she 
defined as the first study to focus on women of the American upper class. Ostrander focused in 
particular on the labor that these women exerted and directed toward preserving and 
strengthening their marriages at all costs. She argued that “the work done by upper-class women 
is largely invisible: that is, it is unpaid and occurs outside the economic marketplace and labor 
force. Therefore, the women’s role in creating and maintaining the economic and political 
 power of the upper class is not typically recognized” (Ostrander 1984: 140; emphasis added). 
Ostrander also argued that these elite women accepted being “inferior” in gender terms 
within their marriages and being submissive to their men because to oppose these norms would 
have meant challenging the class structures that those men were upholding. The women had no 
intention of doing this, because they enjoyed being privileged and upper class: the push toward 
gender liberation was never strong enough to overcome the fear of losing class positioning and 
material privilege by challenging their husbands’ upholding of patriarchal norms. Similar 
processes can be seen at play in my own ethnographic examples, which I detail below. 
Since the second half of the 1980s, Sylvia Yanagisako has been studying wealthy 
entrepreneurial families engaged in silk production in Northern Italy. Her work describes, 
although with clear variations due to the different cultural landscapes of Italy and the United 
States, similarly strict attitudes toward gender roles and how women should relate to their 
families and society at large. “Bourgeois gender ideology rendered female independence an 
oxymoron” (2000: 59), explains Yanagisako: daughters are seen as a loss to the family business 
because they will “belong” to the family they will marry into. Nonetheless, the biggest threat that 
they represent is their potential willingness to claim a share of the family business as inheritance, 
which they would be entitled to by law. Therefore, they are socialized from very early on away 
from the operational family business and toward the social and relational side of the family, 
which is just as important and run entirely by the women (see also Bourdieu 1996: 281). 
Likewise, reflecting on issues of gender and inheritance in the context of Portuguese elite 
families, Antonia Pedroso de Lima (2000: 41) articulates the complex ways in which family 
members are not just chosen but constituted to continue the dynastic line. 
This article thus draws together, through critical ethnography, the anthropological focus 
 on cultural succession and dynastic constitution—typified by Pedroso de Lima (2000), 
Yanagisako (2000), and Bourdieu (1996)— and Savage (2015) and Khan’s (2012b) concerns 
with the structural features that allow the production and reproduction of inequalities from which 
elites derive benefit. Echoing Ostrander, the elites whom I studied were deeply reliant on 
feminine, gendered labor that is invisible but crucial to their reproduction. Inequality is thus 
reproduced through gendered, classed, sexed relationships that stretch from individuals to 
families, to businesses, and to the broader social structures that exist within a capitalist society 
(Bear et al. 2015). 
 
Elite and non-elite women in the Alpha Territories: Gender, bodies, and female labor 
Starting from classical anthropological approaches to the study of elites (Abbink and Salverda 
2013; Carrier and Kalb 2015; Nader 1972; Shore and Nugent 2002), the research presented here 
was developed in a way that was sensitive to what Khan (2012a) calls embodied privilege in his 
close-up, ethnographic study of elite adolescents in the United States (see also Schimpfossl 
2014). Shamus Khan and Colin Jerolmack (2013) argue that ethnography and observation during 
fieldwork become even more important when studying elites, who are likely to be highly 
educated, articulate, and able to narrate their selves in interviews to present exactly the image 
that they want the researcher to leave with (on studying financial lawyers, see also Riles 2011). 
As the ethnographic case studies presented here will show, throughout my research I 
attempted to consider the points of view and experiences of different respondents—in this case, 
women who were elite and those women who served the elites—and to hold their roles and 
concerns in mind as I progressed with the ethnography. This was a pragmatic way to go beyond 
what James Carrier (2016) calls the tendency to favor sympathy over empathy with our research 
 subjects, and to follow instead a commitment to studying elites ethnographically and critically. 
Ultimately, the benefits of studying elites through their habitus and “in place” will become 
clearer in the case studies, but this approach certainly responds to Laura Bear and colleagues’ 
(2015) call for studying the inequalities produced by capitalism from an embodied and emplaced 
perspective that is attentive to the multifaceted, complex, and sometimes contradictory nature of 
these processes. If large-scale datasets can to an extent answer the what/how many/how much/for 
how long questions of inequality, it is only ethnographic, qualitative work that can attempt to 
answer the how and the why questions, which are, at the very least, just as important. 
So what can such an ethnographic and critical study of elites look like in practice? For 
this article, I have selected case studies that show two very different groups of women; the first 
comprises wealthy wives who live in expensive suburbs, and the second comprises women who 
work for elite women, though not directly for the specific women in the first group. The first and 
second groups do not know each other. Not all the suburban wives were born very wealthy, as 
their stories make clear, and not all of those who work for the elites are economically 
disadvantaged: one is, for example, a trained academic as well as a professional yoga teacher. At 
the same time, all of the women contribute to the reproduction of the elites that they are part of, 
or work for, through labor that is gendered in nature and very easily missed or erased when 
approaching the issue of elites and inequality through purely statistical or political economic 
perspectives. 
 
“They juggle a lot of balls up in the air, and if they fall it’s a long way down” 
I will call the first group I am focusing on “the wives”: women living in big houses in an 
expensive suburb to the southwest of London. Unsurprisingly, these women turned out to be 
 diverse and not very much at all like “ladies who lunch” (a British stereotype used to describe 
financially comfortable women who occupy their time with frivolous social activities). They 
knew the stereotypes very well, of course, and played with them. Their houses were undoubtedly 
big and expensive: big gardens, many rooms, often a swimming pool in the grounds or in the 
basement, or both. They all had staff, some more than others. The women who said they did not 
have staff usually meant that their staff did not live in; it was a given that they were not cleaning 
the houses or looking after the gardens. Indeed, on my first visit to a house like this, I made the 
mistake, upon being told “no, we don’t have staff” to ask about a team of men that I could see 
clearly working in the garden. The response came at once, slightly annoyed and baffled at my 
faux pas: “Well, yes, they do the garden.” 
Each one of the “wives” made sure to tell me, in private, something to make themselves 
look “grounded,” as one of them put it, and therefore not like the “others.” It could be something 
about not always having had nannies to look after their children, or still doing a few shifts a 
month of work even though they did not need to, just to “stay in touch” with the “real” world. It 
mattered to them that I did not think that they had no idea how the rest of society worked, but 
they chose to demonstrate this to me alone, not in front of the friends whom they would normally 
compete with in spending on outlandish gifts, cars, holidays, clothes, and so on. 
What they wanted to get across, in all of the interactions I had with them, was that being 
them was not easy. Managing their homes and ensuring the smooth climb of their husbands’ 
careers by taking care of absolutely everything else was a demanding job, and their husbands 
were used to efficient and effective staff themselves. Their daily activities included coordinating 
children’s schooling and numerous extracurricular activities, managing staff, overseeing the 
maintenance of large, luxuriously furnished houses in different geographies, and relocating 
 families to different cities when required—doing all of this while maintaining their own 
appearances according to exacting standards of grooming, body shape, and expensive attire. In a 
popular but well-researched book, the anthropologist and journalist Wednesday Martin (2015) 
has recently shown how some elite wives of New York routinely get “bonuses” according to how 
they have performed in any given year and according to whether the children have gotten into the 
right schools, for example. While I did not find any evidence of this myself, the setup I observed 
would make it eminently plausible and possible. 
It was routine for these women to leave their careers when they had children. This was 
not always their preference, but it was clear to them that their husbands were not going to 
advance in their careers unless “the home front” was taken care of through their own dedication 
to the numerous activities outlined above, leaving the man free to work and socialize with clients 
unencumbered by any caring responsibility. Things seem to not have changed substantially from 
more than thirty years ago, when Ostrander (1984) was describing exactly the same processes at 
play for upper-class American women in the early 1980s. 
The women among whom I carried out my research were not all wives, and not all of 
them had children; a minority had made money independently, but most were wealthy through 
their husbands or through inheritance and divorce settlements. Divorce settlements in the Alpha 
Territories can be the kind of events that shake the stock market, because the CEO husbands 
have to flood the market with shares in order to pay out what they owe their wives. Oil executive 
Todd Kozel, French Connection chairman Stephen Marks, and former head of British retailer 
Marks & Spencer Stuart Rose are some of the high-profile businessmen who have had to sell 
large amounts of shares in such divorce cases recently. Such headline-grabbing cases, however, 
distract attention from the financial vulnerability of most elite women in relation to their 
 husbands and fathers. As discussed earlier, control over financial capital among global wealth 
elites is disproportionately concentrated in the hands of men, and divorce settlements within this 
demographic do not always result in the significant distribution of resources among ex-wives. 
For elite women, therefore, staying married to wealthy men is usually the better guarantee of 
maintaining access to material privilege. In addition, the frequency with which divorce disputes 
among elite couples become protracted and antagonistic affairs speaks further to the argument 
that elite wives’ domestic and familial labor is not recognized as a factor in the accumulation of 
wealth—and subsequent reproduction of elite status—by their husbands. 
One of the wives whom I met in the Alpha Territories was called Natasha: she was 
Russian and had lived through the collapse of the Soviet Union; she had to reinvent herself as a 
hotel manager after abandoning a promising career as a scientist. She had a PhD and had worked 
in the health care sector, but after months of her salary going unpaid and seeing no possibility for 
things getting better, she emigrated to Austria. Natasha changed her career entirely, becoming so 
successful in her new hotel management role that she traveled the world on business, which is 
how she met her current, rich husband. As with many of the women whom I interviewed, she had 
a successful career before her marriage. She used the skills and education she had to make sure 
that her children succeeded in every possible way, which for now meant doing well in their own 
education. 
Talking incredibly fast, she ploughed through the weekend schedule of her three children, 
which sounded more demanding than what most adults would take on during an entire 
workweek. They all attended top-ranking private schools, of course, but also excelled at ballet 
and rugby and were fluent in Russian. There were sessions in these (and more) for each child 
every weekend: “We just don’t get to sit in front of the TV, on the sofa, and relax. I don’t know 
 how people do it; where do they find the time?” She was responsible for taking the children to 
their activities, selecting their classes, and monitoring the instructors, as well as for hiring the 
tutors for extra sessions in any subject for which they may not be at the top of the class. She 
explained how the real cost of private school was not the fees; oh no, she pitied the poor parents 
who think that is all there is. They kill themselves to get the children through the door without 
realizing the obscene amount of money required for extra tuition and activities, without which 
there is absolutely no point in sending them there at all: “They just don’t know, but someone 
should tell them!” 
Natasha was not born into an elite, and her story shows just how fluid this category can 
be. Families were trying to enter it by placing their children in expensive public schools—
sometimes not realizing the cost of the extracurricular activities, as we have seen. Some try to 
move into the elite by buying houses in exclusive locations: the suburb in question was famous 
for this, with the wives joking that it was all about the money. Their golf club was, they teased, 
the “municipal” one. You did not need “good blood” or connections to get in: you just needed to 
be able to pay the very substantial membership fees. 
Most of the women do far more than run their children’s education. They also run their 
homes, managing staff and cycles of endless decorating required to keep the house as it should 
be, whether for entertainment purposes—deals, promotions, and general socializing may require 
inviting clients and junior staff home—or for the purposes of keeping the value of those 
properties stable or going up. Many work in property development as a sideline, making 
considerable amounts of money selling and developing properties—often through the networks 
that they have established while looking like “ladies who lunch.” 
All the same, their standard response to questions about what they do is that they do not 
 do anything; it is their husbands who work. Their own labor, crucial as it is to upholding their 
own privilege and ensuring the successful reproduction of the next elite generation, is often 
unrecognized even by the women who perform it. In her work with rural women in Poland after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the anthropologist Frances Pine (2000) showed how their own 
farm labor was not thought of as “labor” or work as such. Although it took up a very 
considerable number of hours in women’s daily lives, while they were also employed full time in 
industry and caring for their families, farming was not something that women “did.” It was 
enmeshed in kinship and not separable as a practice as it was for men, who were recognized as 
farmers by themselves and society at large. 
Back in the exclusive suburb, as far away from rural Poland as could be, the women 
talked about themselves jokingly as “ladies who lunch.” They knew that they were privileged, 
and they played to the role, explaining how they did nothing really and just met their friends for 
coffee. Only, it was never just that, much like the women whom Mandana Limbert (2010) 
describes socializing over coffee in Oman. The “nothing,” another one explained, may well 
include moving an entire family to a different country at almost no notice, over the Christmas 
holidays, because of a promotion received by the husband: “Just make it happen,” he said. “So of 
course, I did it.” 
The central argument of the present article, however, is that, unlike the Polish women 
Pine describes, these women’s labor was not simply reproducing their families: the wives were 
also reproducing themselves as elites. They were facilitating their husbands’ careers and 
associated accumulation of wealth, maintaining their own privileges, and ensuring that their 
children remained in, or gained entrance to, the highest echelons of society. Although similar to 
other (non-elite) women, such as those discussed by Pine (2000), in the sense that their 
 reproductive labor went largely unnoticed, they were also different in terms of their unique 
position in society and the impact that the reproduction of their elites status (and the concomitant 
maintenance of inequality) had on other women around them. 
 
Caring for bodies and souls? Affective and emotional labor for the elites 
We turn now to a different group of women in my research, whose labor also served the needs of 
the elites, albeit in different ways. While they did not specifically work for women of the elites, 
their clients were disproportionately female, and they certainly engaged in labor that in many 
other settings would traditionally fall on female bodies. As we shall see, they shared several 
traits (a disposition or habitus) that are necessary when working in the Alpha Territories, as well 
as a clear inclination toward empathy and the ability to seamlessly perform affective and 
emotional labor. 
Michaela is in her thirties, good looking and well spoken, as are all the other people I 
have met who work with or around the very wealthy. It is a particular kind of beauty, one that 
follows very closely the high standards expected of the wealthy themselves, made of thin body 
shapes, flawless skin, expensive clothes, “good” manners, and a “good” accent, a certain way of 
being polite and pleasant. This is a habitus that seems to be common, or one could even say 
necessary, in this milieu. Indeed, the Dorchester, a famously exclusive hotel in Mayfair, recently 
faced condemnation when a memo detailing the grooming standards required specifically of 
female staff was leaked to the press: these included regular manicures and waxing for women 
who were paid, on average, nine pounds per hour. My own research would suggest that those 
standards are enforced across the board in all hotels in the areas I worked in and among anyone 
who is expected to work for, be seen by, or come into contact with elite clients. Female staff 
 seemed much more aware than their male colleagues of what was and what was not acceptable, 
with some reporting how—informally and never in writing—it was made clear to them at the 
recruiting stage that only “good-looking” employees would be considered. This would explain 
why I have never, in two years in the Alpha Territories, come across anyone at work who did not 
adhere to those exacting standards. While staff were not required to maintain the same levels of 
grooming as the people whom they served, or dress in such expensive attire, elite spaces’ 
exacting aesthetics certainly required standards that would cost time and money to maintain, and 
that were especially difficult for employees on very low wages to maintain. 
Michaela has worked as a beauty therapist in Notting Hill and Knightsbridge for years, 
maintaining bodies to the exacting standards that are expected in these parts of the world, but 
also, crucially and unexpectedly, looking after other needs of these women—and the vast 
majority of her clients were women. When we met in a café, she was pregnant with her second 
child and had stopped working as a beauty therapist after more than a decade of full-time work. 
It was physically demanding, she explained, not just the standing up all the time, but having 
back-to-back clients for hours almost every day. Many of the treatments (especially the 
massages) were hard on her own body. For all this, she was paid on average around 10 pounds an 
hour (according to her, this was standard in the beauty industry) while knowing full well that her 
clients were paying easily hundreds of pounds per hour for the treatments that she provided. 
This disjuncture between the high prices paid by elite women for beauty and “well-
being” services provided by workers such as Michaela and the wages received by such workers 
reflects another aspect of the relations of socioeconomic inequality existent between the two 
groups of women discussed in this article. Service-providing companies—the “middlemen” in 
this landscape—control both the access of workers to their elite clients and the market through 
 which value is placed on the services they provide, reaping handsome profits in the process. 
Such employment structures contribute further to the disconnect between non-elite women’s 
labor and the role it plays in reproducing elite women’s lifestyles. 
Interviewing is a complex craft (Skinner 2013), and for anthropologists it is often about 
what people do not say, what they leave out, the pauses when they speak—what never makes it 
into a transcript. This time it was about a gesture, which Michaela repeated twice: she put her 
hand on her heart. Michaela did this when describing the sense of well-being that she felt when 
making clients feel better. She described how they would come into her treatment room tense, 
sometimes tearful, often lonely, and how by the end of the treatment they would leave looking 
happier and more serene. She thought it was about touch: these women were often alone for long 
periods of time, their husbands focused on their businesses and careers, and they grew lonely and 
sad. The ability to talk to a beautician and be stroked, massaged, and cared for, the physicality of 
it—but also the care and emotional labor that Michaela invested in making them feel better 
(Hochschild 1983; Reay 2004; Skeggs 2004)—certainly did make them feel better. Not only that: 
it also made her feel better. She explicitly said that this was the best part of the job. This was not 
uncommon, and I will return to this sense of well-being below. 
Just like Michaela, Lauren, a young academic who taught yoga part time to supplement 
her income, felt that her work went way beyond the teaching of yoga—itself a complex and 
holistic discipline—and definitely into the caring for, influencing, and managing the emotional 
well-being of her client. That part, again, was what she enjoyed the most. The client she was 
describing was a “highflier”—Lauren’s term—working in the banking sector. She had hired 
Lauren to go to her house in South Kensington to practice yoga with her every morning before 
work. This was connected to the recent breakdown of a personal relationship that the client was 
 trying to come to terms with. The practice of yoga was thus not just a physical but also a deeply 
emotional experience that Lauren had to mediate successfully to help her client through her 
grieving for a lost relationship. Affect and emotional labor were key variables, which were 
brought to bear by the instructor to allow the healing and continued functioning of a highly paid, 
successful woman. 
Finally, we turn to Aurora, who worked as a carer for very wealthy, old, and infirm 
individuals. She explicitly argued that working for the wealthy was much better for her precisely 
because she managed to establish an emotional connection with her clients. She compared her 
experiences working as a carer for the National Health Service (NHS) as opposed to private 
clients. The money was slightly better, but the support that she received from the private 
agencies that employed her was entirely different: they cared for her work and, to a certain 
extent, for her well-being. They understood that supporting her meant that she could cope better 
with the clients. In fact, she felt that with the private clients she was doing work that was 
valuable. She had enough time to make a difference in her clients’ lives and make them feel 
better to the best of her abilities, as opposed to being forced to wash, feed, and clothe an elderly 
person in half an hour, so that she could move to her next appointment. Aurora was aware of and 
reflexive about the implications of her preferences, openly saying that “if my granny had to be 
looked after, I would want her to be looked after by someone she can get to know, who spends 
hours with her and makes her feel valued. Everyone wants that for their own relatives. But not 
everyone can afford it.” 
The women in this section all performed labor that, while being reproductive in nature—
reproducing and looking after elite bodies and minds—was recognized as labor and paid for. 
Even though the rates of pay were never much above minimum wage, and the women often had 
 to spend considerable amounts of money to maintain their own bodies in order to work in the 
Alpha Territories, they also clearly enjoyed some aspects of their work, especially the emotive 
and affective parts of it. One could in fact hypothesize whether, to an extent, a trade-off may 
have existed between relatively low pay and the relatively high job satisfaction achieved through 
emotional connection with the clients. 
This could explain why the women chose to work in the Alpha Territories: they were all 
articulate and skilled enough to choose other clients had they wished to do so. Indeed, an 
important part of the story is that the women who worked in these territories adhered themselves 
to high levels of bodily grooming and were obviously not from the poorest sections of society. 
Their ability to work in these areas meant that they possessed significant amounts of educational 
and social capital. In addition, they possessed what Ashley Mears (2015) calls bodily capital and 
what Diane Reay (2004) refers to as emotional capital, which they were able to mobilize and 
exchange for money in the manner that Arlie Russell Hochschild (1983) and Bev Skeggs (2004) 
describe elsewhere. It was not simply about wealthy elite women ruthlessly exploiting the labor 
of agencyless, poorer women. 
On the other hand, returning to the arguments laid out at the beginning of this article, we 
need to recognize how this intensively affective and emotional labor literally enables the 
production and reproduction of the elites whom I encountered in the Alpha Territories: the wife 
of the executive, who is always away but manages to be not just beautiful but relaxing to be with 
and who is pleasant (Ostrander 1984) because her own sadness has been taken care of, which 
means that her life and marriage are more likely to be a success. 
The yoga sessions in the morning allowed Lauren’s client to keep making money for 
herself, her clients, and the institution she was working for, literally reproducing the inequalities 
 that were structurally responsible for the existence of wealthy elites in the first place. The caring 
that Aurora provided not only allowed the dignified existence in old age of wealthy people, but 
also liberated the time of other women, who could dedicate themselves to other pursuits, which 
would likely involve the reproduction of their own elite families. 
All of this—the nuances, the specificities, and the contradictions—can only be gathered 
and held up for scrutiny, simultaneously and side by side, through an approach that is both 
ethnographic and critical. They do not need to negate one another, nor do they necessarily fit and 
complement each other, but they all exist: they are all part of what was in the field and of what 
constitutes elite reproduction today. 
 
Conclusion 
The successful transfer of wealth from one generation to the next is a key concern of the very 
wealthy, especially at a time when the weight of accumulated capital plays an ever-greater part in 
individuals’ likeliness to belong to the top of the elite, which is usually referred to as “the super-
rich” (Piketty 2014). Savage (2015: 188) uses the image of climbing mountains as a metaphor for 
achieving elite status, stressing how much easier it is to get to the top for those who start higher 
up and who can afford the best “kit.” 
If this ascent to elite status is in large part achieved through the accumulation of financial 
capital, it is usually men who are credited with “making the money” and thus ensuring their 
families’ maintenance of wealth and status. The examples explored in this article show, however, 
how women’s labor enables and facilitates these processes. First, women cover “the home front,” 
taking care of absolutely everything so that their men can focus on their work—and noted 
accumulation of wealth—just as the upper-class women described by Ostrander (1984) did in the 
 1980s. Second, they invest heavily, to the point of leaving their own paid careers—their chance 
to “climb the slopes” independently—in the education and all around development of their 
children, ensuring not just access to the best schools but also monitoring their performance and 
facilitating their social activities. In this sense, if we continue with the climbing metaphor, they 
make sure that the base camp for the next generation is as high up as possible, and they carry 
their children there. Third, in a different context they employ the labor of other, non-elite women 
to help them set up the camp. 
Yet, all of this labor is often invisible and unrecognized, even by the women who 
perform it themselves. This misrecognition—the ladies who lunch, the mothers who are just 
looking after their children—is in line with the devaluation of domestic and reproductive labor, 
which is typical of a patriarchal paradigm whereby it is only “productive” labor that takes place 
outside the household that is recognized. This article has attempted to build an analysis of this 
paradigm, however, by examining the invisible labor of elite women alongside that of non-elite 
women who work for them, and by demonstrating how the labor of both groups of women 
contributes directly to the social and material reproduction of elite privilege and status. 
Dynasty making is a key concern of elite families: it is pursued through long-lasting, 
successful marriages, as well as through the most tax-efficient transfers of inheritances. It is 
bound up with children’s education, as well as with their broader socialization and, eventually, 
their own appropriate, class-compatible marriages. Just as economic capital needs to be protected 
and increased, so does the family. These are long-term, intergenerational concerns that fit well 
with Savage’s (2015), Piketty’s (2014), and Khan’s (2012b) focus on the longue durée of 
accumulation processes and the structural—as well as cultural—processes that make elite 
reproduction possible. 
 The data presented in this article show how, in the transfer and reproduction of wealth, 
and the lives of the people able to manage and grow that wealth, women’s work is clearly 
central. By using a critical ethnographic approach, I have focused on the how, and in doing so 
have opened up spaces to consider the two seemingly distant, if not contradictory, categories of 
“wives” and working women. In light of these data, elite London has emerged as a social space 
structured around strong hierarchies not just of class but also of gender. It is essential to 
understand more about the interplay of these two structuring principles within elite spaces, 
focusing on the “invisible” labor performed by both elite and non-elite women. 
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Notes 
                                                          
1
. “Life in the ‘Alpha Territory’: London’s ‘Super-Rich’ Neighbourhoods” (ES/K002503/1) led 
by Roger Burrows (Newcastle University) joined by Mike Savage (LSE), Caroline Knowles 
(Goldsmiths University), Tim Butler (KCL), Rowland Atkinson (Sheffield University), David 
Rhodes (University of York), and myself. 
2
. The downside of such an approach was that I was never sure of the exact economic or financial 
position of my respondents: I relied instead on indicators such as the house prices of the areas 
they lived in coupled with their mentioning of a number of second homes in prestigious 
locations, the use of wealth management services, private clubs, and the types of cars they would 
drive. It would have been impossible, however, to conduct in-depth ethnographic work with 
these groups had there been a need to have clear, open conversations about their financial 
positions, especially at the beginning of the research process. 
